















IDENTITY, DISTRIBUTION RULES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN 


























Universidade Caltolica Portuguesa,  
Catolica Porto Business School and CEGE.  
Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327 4169-005 Porto, Portugal 
Email: hmarreiros@porto.ucp.pt. 
This version: March 2017 
Abstract 
This paper examines experimentally the effects of social identity and 
communication on teams’ distributional rules and wealth creation. The context 
studied is team production with multiple resource owners of different skills. In these 
organizational settings, heterogeneity of skills might create a conflict between equity, 
equality and social welfare. The results of a two-stage experiment, where participants 
vote in the distributional rule in stage I and make their effort decisions in stage II, 
indicate that induced group identity prompts preferences for equality even at the 
expense of wealth creation. We find that compared to a setting where social 
interaction is absent, identity does not increase team productivity, but equalizes 
individual payoffs. These findings suggest that group identity triggers the wide spread 
use of equal sharing rules by heterogeneous teams, as it increases the team’s level of 
egalitarianism. This paper provides recommendations for organizational decision-
making.  
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This paper examines experimentally how social identity affects distributional 
preferences and productivity of heterogeneous teams. The context is team production 
technology with self-management organization design and the heterogeneity focus is 
individual skills.  
Self-management organization design implies that each collaborating party 
receives in return a share of the total output produced, and input contributions do not 
enter into the compensation function (no monitoring).  
The relevance of this study is justified by the proliferation of production setups 
with output based compensation practices (workers cooperatives, partnerships, self-
managed production teams, profit sharing scheme, etc.) even though standard 
economic theory predicts inefficiencies in these organization designs due to free 
riding behavior (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982).  
Self-managed teams have grown rapidly in popularity following their introduction 
in the 1960s along with the idea that teamwork is a key to productivity. In the 1980’s 
in the United Kingdom and United States alone almost 50 per cent of companies were 
using self-managed work teams within their organizational structure (Huczynski and 
Buchanan, 1985). This percentage grows to around 70 percent of companies in the 
Fortune 1000 and to 81 percent of US manufacturing companies in the 1990’s 
(Lawler et al., 1995). Because of their widespread use, research has been devoted to 
analyze how to increase productivity. However, little is known about output 
distributional rules among group members with different skills, in production settings 
with team production technology and self-management organization design. 
This article aims to bridge this gap by answering three research questions: (1) 
What are the individual distributional preferences when they interact in an 
heterogeneous group? (2) Does induced group identity with communication change 
these preferences? (3) Does induced group identity affect effort supply and wealth 
creation?  
Distributional preferences show up as individual or team sharing rule decisions 
that determine how joint output is allocated among them. By group identity we mean 
that individuals actions when collaborating in production consider the benefit of the 
group instead of self-benefit. An individual that is identified with the team cares about 
the wellbeing of other group members when making some actions. Finally, wealth 
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creation is measured by the difference between the value of production and the inputs 
total opportunity costs.  
Having heterogeneous inputs into the same team production technology makes 
sense, because it takes advantage of the combination of different backgrounds and 
experiences of team members (Hamilton, 2003, 2004; Lazear, 1998; Farrel and 
Scotchmer, 1988). Consider, for example, the range of abilities in university’ research 
groups or in medical and lawyer partnerships. Deciding upon a distributional rule that 
doesn’t damage personal relations and work motivation is a social and economic 
dilemma. Social identity and social preferences can play a determinant role in 
mitigating these conflicts. Nonetheless, research on the effects of social identity in 
redistribution in a team production setting has been scant.  
To answer our research questions, we design a non-real effort experiment with two 
treatments. In the first treatment no interaction is allowed, in the second treatment, 
identity is manufactured in a pre-stage game and communication is allowed in the 
first stage of a two-stage game. We induce identity as in Chen and Li (2009), where 
participants were randomly matched in different group colors and discussed for about 
10 minutes which author, Picasso or Dali, painted the pictures we showed them.   
The game is the same in both treatments. Groups, composed by individuals that 
differ in skills, have to decide how to distribute the team production in a first stage, by 
simple majority rule, and make their contributions in a second stage. In the first stage 
they are given three options: an equal distribution rule; the second best sharing rule, 
which is proportional to members’ skills and a median sharing rule that weights equal 
sharing and wealth maximization criteria, i.e. gives part to needs and part to skills. 
Therefore, the first treatment allows us to understand individual and team’s level of 
preferences for equality. The second treatment allows us to study the effect of induced 
identity on those preferences. 
Our results provide clear answers for our research questions. We show that: (1) 
when no interaction is allowed, individuals show selfish behavior in their choice of 
the sharing rule. A higher proportion of individuals with high (low, respectively) 
skills choose the second best (egalitarian, respectively) sharing rule, which is the one 
that benefits them the most. (2) We find that communication and group identity 
formation changes distributional preferences favoring a more egalitarian sharing rule 
among the high skilled individuals. (3) Communication-group identity increases the 
effort contribution of low skilled individuals in equal sharing groups, with respect to 
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those without group identity, but do not affect the input contributions of high skilled 
individuals, also compared with the contribution without identity.  
Most of the research on team incentives considers symmetric members where 
equal sharing is common practice (see for example Encinosa, et al., 2007, Farrel and 
Scotchmer, 1988). However, in teams composed by members who differ in skills or 
productivities, a distributional rule proportional to members’ skills should be used to 
increase productivity (see chapter 3).  
Some reasons for this apparent paradox are connected to theories of justice that 
incorporate a concern for the well-being of the least well-off members of the society. 
Examples are Rawlsian preferences for equality or the need principle, which calls for 
the equal satisfaction of the basic needs (see Konow, 2003 for an extensive review on 
theories of justice). Other reasons are connected with difference aversion theories 
supported by experimental evidence that suggests that some individuals dislike 
inequitable outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002) or fairness considerations (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). 
However, most of the difference aversion experiments consider homogenous 
participants and/or equal split. 
Social identity is considered a phenomenon that prompts actions that favour the 
group instead of self-maximization (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, Ashforth et al, 1989; 
Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005, 2008; Eckel and Grossman (2005); Chen and Li, 
2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010). According to the social identity theory, if individuals 
are identified with the group they belong to, they will take actions that are congruent 
to the prescribed behaviour for the group, even if those actions depart from self-
maximization and imply a monetary loss. However, group identity experiments 
mainly focus on ingroup versus outgroup interactions. 
The results of this experiment show that communication and identity do not change 
the total wealth creation in production; the change towards more egalitarian output 
sharing rules induced by identity is followed up by an input contribution behavior that 
neutralizes the potential effects of more equal sharing rules in wealth created. 
Our findings suggest that if individual get an intangible payoff from more 
egalitarian sharing rules then equal sharing rules increase welfare as the intangible 
payoff is at no cost from efficiency lost.   
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This paper contributes to management and economic literature by taking a novel 
approach that combines the social identity and the social preferences streams of 
research in a team production technology setting that allows for diversity.  
 
II. Related literature 
A. Theories of justice and social preferences  
The conflict between equality and efficiency has been continuously present in 
economic environments, since Adam Smith (1759), Marx (1875), Sen (1966) and 
Rawls (1971) to the present day. The literature on theories of justice shows that 
different principles of justice lead to heterogeneous distributional preferences in 
different contexts. For one hand individuals can have principles that incorporate a 
concern for the well-being of the least well-off members of the society such as 
Rawlsian preferences for equality or the need principle, which calls for the equal 
satisfaction of the basic needs. On the other hand, individuals can have utilitarianism 
principles, which implies that resources must be allocated first to the person who 
derives the greater marginal utility; or welfarism, which implies aggregation of 
individual utilities to derive social welfare; or even equity principles, which are based 
on proportionality and individual responsibility and accountability (see Konow, 2003, 
for an extensive review on theories of justice and its empirical evidence). 
Although the impact that distributional preferences have on economic outcomes 
have been discussed under several theories of justice during the past years, in the last 
decade the social preferences literature has been given a great deal of attention due to 
the growing number of economic experiments finding discrepancies between 
efficiency and equality in agents’ behavior. (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). These scholars developed models of 
difference aversion based on the premise that in addition to self-interested individuals, 
some are concerned about the payoff of others, disliking outcomes that are perceived 
as inequitable.  
 
A. Social Identity 
a. Social Identity Theory: From Psychology to Economics  
Bringing the social-psychological concept of identity to economic analysis can 
convey advantages for the study of group behavior as it can account for many 
phenomena that standard economics cannot well explain. According to the social 
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identity theory (SIT), developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), social identity could be 
defined as a perception of oneness with a group of persons. It has three major 
components: categorization, identification and comparison. The first is the process of 
putting others and ourselves into categories, such as gender, ethnicity, profession, age 
cohort, religious affiliation, sports clubs, etc. As these examples suggest, people may 
be classified in various categories. A woman can be Asian, a young lawyer, affiliated 
to some religion, political party and/or be a fan of some sports club. This social 
classification enables individuals to locate or define themselves in the social 
environment. Categorization leads to identification, which is the process by which we 
associate ourselves with certain groups. Finally, identification may lead to 
comparison, which is the process by which we compare our groups with other groups, 
creating some favoritism towards the group we belong to.   
Social identity has been shown to be a central concept in understanding group 
behavior in social psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science. 
Management science has also applied the SIT to explain organizational identification. 
Ashforth el al. (1989) argues that organizational identification is a specific form of 
social identification as the individuals’ organization may provide an answer to the 
question: who am I? The SIT literature suggests three general consequences to 
organizations. Firstly, individuals tend to perform actions consistent with relevant 
aspects of their identities. Secondly, it affects the outcomes associated with intragroup 
cohesion, cooperation, fairness, altruism, pride and loyalty to an organization or to its 
corporate culture. Finally identification may also prompt internalization and 
adherence to group values and norms and engender homogeneity in attitudes and 
behavior. Being our experiment on a certain type of organizations, we expect to shed 
light on these consequences.  
The concept of identity was formal introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
They incorporate identity as a motivation for behavior in individual’s utility function. 
In their formulation, identity is based on social categories, C. Each person i has an 
assignment of people to these categories, 𝒄𝒊, so that each person has a conception of 
her own categories and that of all other people. Prescriptions P indicate the behavior 
appropriate for people in different social categories in different situations. The 
prescriptions may also describe an ideal for each category in terms of physical 
characteristics and other attributes. Categories may also have higher or lower social 
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status. They use the word identity to describe both a person’s self-image as well as 
her assigned categories. 
In the last years the economics of identity analysis was extended to organizations 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2005) and workgroup (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008). In these 
studies identity is incorporated in a principal-agent model and in principal-multi agent 
model (respectively) and works as a part of incentives. Their model contrasts with the 
standard economic model where an individual’s preferences are fixed and utility are 
not situation dependent. In their framework when an individual enters an organization 
and adapts its organization culture, he will take actions to fulfill the organizations’ 
goals to feel like an insider. On the other hand, if he feels like an outsider, he will take 
actions that are against the organization or workgroup. 
 In this article we adopt AK formulation and expand on their work to study how 
social identity conditions fairness and affects effort levels and productivity in a self-
managed organization setting composed by heterogeneous members.  
 
b. Social Identity Research in Experimental Economics 
There is a growing number of economic experiments suggesting that natural group 
identity increase ingroup favoritism, which increases altruism and cooperation 
(Bernhard el al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006).  
The study that more relates to ours is Chen and Li (2009). Their results suggest 
that in allocation games induced social identity increases altruism and charity 
concerns towards members of their own group and decreases envy as well as 
increases the odds that individuals choose social welfare maximizing actions. Our 
experiment has clear differences from theirs. First, our setting is set to represent 
organizations, specifically self-managed teams, where individual profits are not 
directly comparable since contributions are not observable. Second, we allow subjects 
to vote on the distribution rule, which in turn will derive the payoffs. Third, and more 
importantly, we focus on members with heterogeneous skills; and finally we do not 
use ingroup/outgroup comparison, mainly due to our experimental setting.  
Eckel and Grossman (2005), find that induced team identity in a repeated public 
good game increases cooperation limiting the individual free-riding problem normally 
observed in team games. However, once again, they focus on homogeneous subjects 
and use an equal distributional rule given exogenously.  
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Another study on social identity that is related to our work is Klor and Shayo 
(2010) minimal group experiment on the effect of social identity on preferences over 
distribution. They analyze the voting decisions on redistribution of tax regimes of two 
distinct natural groups that are randomly assigned gross incomes, majority rules. They 
find that in many cases, individuals forego monetary payoffs and vote for the tax rate 
that benefits their own group.  
Therefore, this article differentiates from previous experimental evidence on social 
identity as it studies heterogeneous teams’ behavior, both in terms of redistribution 
and effort decisions. Moreover, our analysis does not focus only on the effects of 
identity on distribution rules but also on efficiency considerations. Next, we present a 
theoretical explanation for teams’ distributional rules, based on social identity, which 
we then test experimentally. 
 
III. Theoretical framework: A Team production setting 
This section contains the description of the collective and individual decision 
process in a production set up with a team production technology where each input is 
provided by a different collaborating person. In exchange for the collaboration each 
input provider receives a share of the total output produced. The way output is shared 
among the group members is decided by secret majority voting among group 
members. When voting team members know that there will be a second stage when 
the input decisions are made, output is observed and the sharing rule is applied to that 
output. The experimental game is played under two situations, no identity treatment 
and identity treatment. In the second case the identity treatment is the first step, next 
the voting of the sharing and finally the input contribution decisions. As indicated, 
and to make relevant the efficiency-equality dilemma in the choice of the decision 
rule, production groups are composed of two types of individuals, high skilled and 
low skilled ones. Individuals collaborating in the experiment are randomly assigned to 
one or other skills’ groups before they decide on the sharing rule.    
 Production involves N>2 inputs, each belonging to a different resource owner, 
indexed by i=1,2,…N. To simplify the exposition we identify a resource owner with a 
worker endowed with an observable level of skill  takes contributes to 
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intermediate weight is given to each goal, efficiency and equality. In the experiment 
set up the group members will vote on the choice between these three values of α. 
In this research we follow Akerlof and Kranton (2010) and assume that 
individuals’ perception of equality or fairness depends on the social context. When 
individuals join for production each can have a different personal and social 
background that conditions her preferences for egalitarian or efficiency led outcomes. 
Therefore we expect that individual preferences will show up in the voting stage. 
Since some individuals will be that they are assigned to the high skill or to the low 
skill group when they decide on the sharing rule, the high skilled ones will be aware 
that the efficiency based sharing rule will give them higher monetary pay off than the 
equal sharing one. On the other hand, low skilled individuals will know that their pay 
off will be higher under the equal sharing rule than under the efficient one. From a 
selfish behavior we expect then that high (low) skilled individuals will majority vote 
for α=0 (1). Deviations from this selfish behavior will indicate the starting preferences 
for egalitarian outcomes of high skilled individuals, and efficiency preferences shown 
by the low skilled ones.  
The experiment is next modified to allow for communication among group 
members and to induce some sense of group identity among them. This could modify 
the initial social context and change the relative preference for egalitarian, efficiency 
sharing rules, with respect to those before the treatment.  
 
IV. Experimental design and implementation 
The goal of the experiment is to observe the behavior of individuals in the 
organizational environment described above, and obtain evidence on whether 
distributional concerns and social preferences influence the behavior of people so that 
this behavior departs from the predicted one under the assumption that individuals are 
selfish and social concerns do not matter in production environments. The experiment 
consists in a two-stage decision process where first individuals decide on how they 
will share the output from production and next they decide on the effort contribution. 
The two stages decision process is repeated, one time without identity treatment (VT) 
and the other time after the identity treatment (IT).  
In this section we describe in detail the team production technology with inputs of 
different quality, high and low skilled labor input, together with the functional form 
for the opportunity cost of the resource input. Next we solve for the Nash equilibrium 
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solution in input contributions by the team members for each sharing rule proposed 
above, and no social preferences at all, i.e. individuals maximize only monetary pay-
offs. The solution to the game in terms of Nash equilibrium and no social preferences 
provides a benchmark to which compare the observed decisions and outcomes after 
running the experiment. If the observed behavior and performance departs from the 
benchmark then we will examine if the departure is consistent with the predictions 
under the assumption that group identity and social preferences do indeed influence 
the effort decisions of group members in self-managed, output-sharing, organizational 
designs.  
Along the experiment each production group will have five members, N=5. Three 
of the members are high skilled and two low skilled. Each group member has a vote 
and the output sharing rule is decided my secret majority voting. The level of skills 
for each of the high and for each of the low skilled individuals is the same so in terms 
of pay offs this symmetry implies that each high and each low skilled individual will 
expect the same pay off once the sharing rule is decided. Therefore all else equal in 
the choice of the sharing rule there is a natural majority of high skilled individuals 
whose interests should determine the chosen rule.  
A. Experimental parameters 
The team production technology is given by the functional form
1
: 
𝐹(𝑎&, 𝑎3, … , 𝑎4) = 𝑘/(𝑞&, 𝑞3, … , 𝑞4)𝑎/
4
/6&  , qi >1         (1) 
Where and qi is set to represent member’s skills and ki is a function that aggregates 
the skills of team members into a measure of the productivity of member i. The 
complementary skills of group members that justify the joint production and give an 
output from joint production higher than the sum of individual outputs, for the same 
level of input ai, is captured by the assumption that ki is increasing in qi, for all i, and 
ki(q1,…,qN)>ki(q1,,,qN-S) for any subset S in N. ki≥1 for any i
2
. In our experiment we 
set the function ki( ) so that the contribution to productivity of input i is higher for the 
own skill than for the skills of other team members:  , qi>1. 
                                                
1
 The functional form of the production technology borrows from Hamilton et al (2004). 
2
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The cost of input i is given by:   
By assumption  so higher  implies a lower marginal cost, for a 
given value of  ; therefore marginal cost decreases with the endowed skill.   
The distinction between high and low skilled individuals implies is instrumented 
by setting qhigh=10, for each of the three high skilled group members, and qlow=5 for 
each of the two low skilled members, in all the experiments.    
Taking into account the general output sharing rule introduced above, the payoff of 
individual i is given by: 
𝜋/ = 1 − 𝛼 𝑆/
∗ + 𝛼 5 𝑘/𝑎/
4
/ − 𝑎/
3 2𝑞/,            (2) 
     with 𝛼	𝜖 0,1  and khigh skilled=24 and klow skilled=17, for the functional form and 
selected q values. 
The three sharing rules the group members will vote on imply different values of 
parameter α that captures the weight given to the egalitarian sharing rule, α=1 (equal 
sharing), α=0, only efficiency matters (second best) and α=1/2, half and half. The 
solution for the Nash equilibrium that will serve as benchmark for comparing the 
results of the experiment for the three sharing rules requires first solving for the 
second best sharing rule, Si
*
. Following the solution process described in section , the 




=0.05. This implies that under option A, equal 
sharing, Si=1/5, the same for all members; under option B, what we call median 
proportional, Si
H
=0.25 for each of the high ability participants and Si
L
=0.125 for each 
low ability participants; and under option C, second best shares, Si
H
=0.30 for each of 
the high ability participants and Si
L
=0.05 for each low ability ones. 
Table 1: Experimental parameters  
Parameters   
Ability of high types 10 
Ability of low types 5 
k (value of number) high types 24 







Option A 20% 
Option B - high ability 25% 
Option B - low ability 12.5% 
Option C - high ability 30% 

























effort    
High 48 60 72 
Low 17 11 4 
Expected payoff  
High 692 994 1337 
Low 778 575 265 
Total team profit 3631 4130 4540 
Efficient effort  
High 240 
Low 85 
Team wealth 10085 
 
As expected the Nash equilibriums for the output sharing self-managed 
organizations give lower welfare and lower input contributions than the first best. The 
second best is, by construction, the sharing rule with higher pay off. As we move 
from equal sharing to second best the high (low) skilled members contribute with 
higher (lower) input to joint production. Under the equal sharing low skilled get high 
pay off than high skilled even though the former contribute with lower input to 
production than the latter. If the correlation between input contribution and pay off is 
taken as an indication of fairness then the proportional and the second best sharing 
rules would be consider fairer than equal sharing. Equal output sharing is the sharing 
rule with more equal pay off for high and for high skilled individuals, while the 
second best sharing rule is the one giving less egalitarian outcome.   
 
B. Experimental treatments and implementation 
i) Treatments 
As mentioned the experiment is designed to understand the effects of identity on 
participants distributional preferences and on team efficiency taking into 
consideration the setup described previously. Thus, it has two treatments: the voting 
treatment, henceforward VT, where no interaction is allowed and the identity 
treatment, henceforward IDT, where the structure is similar to the VT but identity is 
manufactured in a pre-stage and communication allowed in the voting stage. We 
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discuss in detail the design choices for induce identity in a separate subsection ahead. 
The VT is designed to help us understand the distribution preferences of members 
when there is no social interaction and serve as a control treatment to compare 
individual and group behavior under the IDT.  
We divide the treatments in two settings: the one shot setting, where participants 
vote and make decisions on effort in one round; and the 10 rounds setting, where 
participants play the vote stage just in the first round and make decisions on effort for 
10 rounds.  The 10 rounds setting is partner matching. This division was based on two 
concerns. First, the one-shot setting will allow us to study distributional preferences 
without reputation and reciprocity considerations. On the other hand, a repetition of 
the contribution stage is important to form a higher degree of group cohesion and 
allow for “long-term” interaction. Therefore, the one-shot setting and the first round 
of the ten-rounds setting allow us to compare individual distributional preferences 
when matched with a group just for one time and when matched for ten rounds.  
At the end of each session participants fulfill a questionnaire were in addition to 
some demographic questions, they are asked about the level of fairness of the sharing 
rule decided by the group, their level of group attachment during the experiment and 
the effect of communication on voting and effort decisions. In the VT we omit from 
their questionnaire questions related with communication. For more details in 
implementation, information conditions and design discussion see Appendix B.  
 
V. Hypotheses  
The experiment is designed to understand teams’ decision making and test the 
validity of our theoretical explanation. Next we present the null hypothesis and our 
conjectures on results.  
i) Hypotheses:  Voting treatment  
Hypothesis 1a:High ability members vote for the second best sharing rule  
Hypothesis 1b: Low ability members vote for the equal sharing rule. 
Assuming standard economic preferences, it is a dominant strategy for more 
productive members to choose second best sharing rules (α=0 in equation 1 and 2), 
whereas it is a dominant strategy for less productive members to choose equal sharing 
rules (α=1) since it maximizes their utility.  Therefore, our null hypotheses are that the 
majority of individuals will show self-interest behavior. We do not expect to reject 
these hypotheses.  
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Hypothesis 2: In majority high ability teams, the most voted sharing rule is the 
second best sharing rule.  
i) Hypotheses: Effect of Identity 
Hypothesis 3: Identity does not affect participants’ distributional preferences.  
According to the standard economic theory, individuals are self-interested and 
identity should not have an impact on their decisions. However, following our 
theoretical argument that preferences can be changed by the creation and 
manipulation of the social categories (ci) and prescriptions (P) backed up by previous 
experimental evidence (Chen and Li, 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010) we conjecture that 
induced identity may affect individuals decision on efforts. Therefore, we expect to 
reject this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Identity does not affect teams’ distributional rules. Thus, in majority 
high ability teams, the most voted sharing rule is the second best sharing.  
Following hypothesis 3, with or without induced identity teams composed by 
majority high skilled members will chose second best sharing rules.  
Hypothesis 5a: Identity does not increases effort levels of high skilled players.  
Hypothesis 5b: Identity does not increase effort levels of low skilled players.  
According to the standard economic theory induced identity should not influence 
effort decisions. However, there is previous experimental evidence indicating that 
identity increases the effort level of team members (Eckel and Grossman, 2005) 
Additionally, a number of experiments provide evidence that communication 
increases cooperation (Farrel, 1995; Crawford, 1998; Blume and Ortman, 2007).  
Hypothesis 6: Identity does not increase team efficiency.  
Following hypotheses 5, induced identity should not increase team efficiency.  
Nevertheless, as we conjecture that identity increase effort levels it should also 
increase efficiency. Thus, we expect to reject this hypothesis.  
 
VI. Results 
A total of 100 participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in several 
disciplines (economics, literature, business, sociology, etc) by Orsee recruitment 
software at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. The experiment was designed in Z-
tree software and lasted around 2 hours on average.  All participants received a 5€ 
participation fee and earn, on average, 14€ per subject. We conducted two session per 
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treatment. We collected a total of 40 independent observations per group, which are 
the base of our statistical analysis.
3
 
We first present the voting results analyzing team’s distributional preferences and 
the effect of identity in those preferences. We then analyze the effect of voting 
decisions and induced identity on contributions and team efficiency. Following this, 
communication and post-experimental questionnaire analyses are presented.  
 
1. Voting results 
1) Individual distributional preferences 
In this section we analyze the team voting decisions. Recall that participants could 
vote for option A, equal sharing; option B, median proportional or on option C, 
second best sharing rule. Each subject voted twice in each session, in the one shot 
setting and in the first round of the 10 rounds setting. As we do not find significant 
differences on voting decisions between the two settings (U-test p= 0.8474) we use 
both in the results report.  
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of votes by treatment and type 
 
Figure 1 shows the voting decisions per type and treatment. It can be seen that in 
the VT 60 percent of the high ability players vote for the second best (option C), 33 
percent voted for the equal share (75 percent being females) and 7 percent voted for 
the median share; 85 percent of the low ability participants vote for the equal sharing 
rule, 13 percent voted in the median share (all males) and only 2 percent voted in the 
second best.  
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Therefore, we observe that participants exhibit standard economic preferences and 
make their decisions according to their dominant strategy. While the majority of high 
ability members vote for the second best sharing rule (binomial test α=0.5, p= 0.077), 
the majority of low ability members vote for the equal sharing rule (binomial test 
α=0.5, p= 0. 0.000)
 4
. As expected we cannot reject hypothesis 1a or 1b that members 
prefer the compensation scheme that gives them better monetary payoffs.  
Although these results are in line with our conjectures, we find a considerable 
number of high ability participants voting for equal sharing (33 percent) in the VT 
and heterogeneity on individual preferences.  According to our theoretical 
explanation, in the groups test in the experiments, there are 67 percent of participants 
whose identity (Ii) reflects self-interest, equity or social welfare concerns and 33 
percent whose identity reflect preferences for equality, concern for the least well off 
or even advantage aversion
5
 a la Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In what concerns the low 
ability participants, the high majority shows self-interest, equality concerns or 
disadvantage aversion. Nevertheless, we find 13 percent of participants preferring the 
mix sharing rule, indicating some equity or social welfare concern. Although is quite 
difficult to disentangle the reasons behind the voting decisions, as one or all these 
reasons could be behind participants decisions, the results support our theory that 
individuals level of egalitarianism depend of their personal identities, which can be 
quite heterogeneous taking in account the different social categories an individual 
might belong to (e.g. being a woman, a mother, a sports fan, a lawyer, an ecological 
activist, etc) and the different past experiments that form each individual in an unique 
personality. On the other hand, we have assumed that fairness considerations are 
context depend. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that in an experimental context, 
individuals enter at the laboratory as equals, without knowing anything about each 
other and are given random roles. Because of that participants could consider an 
egalitarian outcome as equitable. The post-questionnaire analysis ahead could give us 
some insights on this phenomenon. We then came back to this point.    
Our results are in line with experiments on democratic choice of institutions as in 
Balafoutas et al. (2013). They use a sharing rule a la Sen (1966) in a public group 
experiment where three different participants with different initial endowments have 
to vote on their preferred level of redistribution in each period, from equal to 
                                                
4
 Fisher test confirms the significance of the results. .  
5
 Individuals that would like to minimize differences in utility  
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proportional. Although this experiment is not directly comparable with ours, as in 
each period contributions are observable and voting is repeated, it is the closest 
experiment in the literature. Similar to our results, they find that the high majority of 
high endowment participants prefer proportional and low endowment participants 
prefer more equal distributions. They also find that a few percentage of participants 
deviate from selfish preferences.  They attribute this behavior to inequality aversion 
motives. Nevertheless, in our context, where contributions are not observable and the 
proportional sharing rule is not on effort but on skills, inequality aversion is hardly 
probable to be the case. According to Mohnen et al. (2008), when contributions are 
not observable after each period (they called the nontransparent case), inequality 
aversion does not alter equilibrium levels of effort when compared to the case where 
individuals are purely selfish.  
An interesting and clear result of the VT is the significant effect of gender in 
voting decisions (the gender coefficient is highly significant in a logit regression 
analysis - table 9 in appendix B). We find that 75 percent of the high ability 
participants that vote for equality were females. This is an indicator that belonging to 
other social categories matter for distribution preferences. This result contradict 
Balafoutas et al. (2013) as they do not find support for the effect of individual 
preferences on voting and find no significant differences in voting behavior of 
females. They argue that voting is only directly affected by their earning,  
In the IDT we observe a significant difference in the voting decisions of high 
ability members in comparison to the VT (Mann-Whitney test, p= 0.0003). We find 
that the percentage of votes in equal share increases from 33 percent in the VT to 67 
percent on the IDT. However, we do not find a significant effect of identity on low 
ability distributional preferences (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.2915). Therefore, we can 
only partial reject hypothesis 3.  
While in the VT the proportion of self-maximizers
6
 is seventy percent and the 
egalitarians
7
 are just twenty percent, in the IDT the percentage of self-maximizers 
decreased by 29 percent (U-test, p=0.0040) and the percentage of egalitarians 
increased 50 percent (U-test, p= 0.0021).    
Our theoretical explanation suggests that individuals can be affected by social 
identity. We consider that in the IDT the induced identity could have manipulated or 
                                                
6
 Participants that choose the sharing rule that lead them to a better payoff.  
7
 High abilities that vote for equal sharing even decreasing their own economic wellbeing  
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even changed the prescribed behavior (P) for the team (ci) and therefore affected 
individuals revealed preferences. Consider for example, a high ability individual that 
had equity preferences but due to social interaction with the group, in the pictures 
stage and/or in the voting stage chat, changed her reveled preferences towards 
equality. The reason behind this decision is connected with the behavior she considers 
ideal (P), or because is the social correct action, or because she became altruist 
towards her teammates or even because an implicit norm of equality emerged on the 
group. The communication analysis ahead could helps to understand behavior under 
induced identity. 
Our results on the effects of social identity are consistent to Chen and Li (2009) 
and Klor and Shayo (2010) in the sense that it seems to increase charity concerns for 
the least well off even at expense of monetary compensation.  However, our findings 
contradict their results and the SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) as it fails to induce 
social welfare-maximizing actions in favor of self-interest actions. Considering that 
induced identity should lead participants to take non-selfish actions in favor of the 
group welfare, we expected to find a higher and considerable number of low ability 
participants choosing second best sharing rule or at least median sharing as the second 
best create a great amount of dispersion.  However, this is not the case. It seems that 
in this setting, induced identity only induce to equality. It could be the case that this 
happens because there is a majority of high ability members on the team. It would be 
interesting to analyze the effect of identity on majority low ability teams.   
 
2) Teams’ distribution rules.  
Figure 2 summarizes the voting results per groups. Interestingly, in the VT, the 
most voted sharing rule was the equal sharing with 11 out of 20 groups (55%) voting 
for it. There were 3 groups (15%) where the median share was chosen to be the 
distributional rule (determined randomly in two of them due to a tie) and there were 6 
groups (30%) where the majority voted for the proportional sharing rule. We can 
reject hypothesis 2 that in teams mostly composed by high ability members, the most 




Figure 2: Group vote results 
 
This is an unexpected result. Considering that only 33 percent of the high ability 
participants voted for the equal sharing. We consider that this is an effect of the low 
majority rule of the voting procedure. As the less skilled participants vote strongly in 
favor of the equal sharing, in 50 percent of the teams at least one high ability member 
had to vote for equal sharing. In a more detailed analysis, we find that in all the cases 
(settings and sessions) where the team chose an equal distribution of output the 
decision was made by a low majority of two low ability and one high ability 
participants.  
Figure 3 illustrates how groups reach the decision on the distributional rule. We 
can see that in the VT the majority of groups reaches a decision by low majority (3 
members) and that reaching a consensus is quite rare. In both of the two ties, two high 
ability members vote for second best, one vote for the median share and the two low 
abilities vote for the equal sharing. The votes of low abilities on median share where 
in groups where the majority of high abilities vote for second best.  
With identity, about 77 percent of the participants voted in the equal sharing, 13 
percent voted in the proportional share and 10 percent voted in median share. 
Consequently, there was a significant increase of groups using equal compensation 
schemes (90 percent) (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.000). The percentage of groups that 
decide to perform under the second best distribution rule decreases by 100 percent 
(Mann-Whitney test, p=0.000) as the group performed under this compensation 
scheme was decided randomly due to a tie in the one shot setting. Therefore, as 










expected, we can reject hypothesis 4 that identity does not affect team’s distributional 
rules.  
Observation 1: Without social interaction, in majority high ability teams, a low 
majority of groups (55%) decide to use equal sharing rules. With identity almost all 
groups (90%) decide to perform under an equal distribution rule.  Therefore, team 
identity is a plausible explanation for the use of equal distributions in heterogeneous 
self-managed teams.  
 
Under group identity, and given the possibility of communication, we would 
expect a group norm to emerge accordingly to on the team objectives. If the team 
seeks a higher creation of wealth they would choose second best sharing rules (α=0), 
if the teams decides it is important to give part to need and part to abilities, would 
choose an α=0.5. And if the team prefers to minimize differences in utility, even with 
a loss on wealth creation, would choose and α close to 1. However, an equal sharing 
(α=1) will minimize differences in utilities only if members have identical cost. In the 
case of heterogeneous teams on abilities, where costs on effort are different, the 
minimal α
*
 is lower than 1 even for a difference aversion team. Notwithstanding, the 
majority of teams decided for an equal sharing which damages team efficiency 
(Marreiros, 2010). Therefore, we would expect contribution to increase to a threshold 
that suppresses the efficiency damage that arises with the equal sharing rule. 
 
2. Effort levels  
In this section we analyze the effect that the voting decisions and identity have on 
actual contributions. In the VT we find that the majority of high ability members 
exhibit standard economic preferences, i.e. choose second best sharing rules, 
however, the majority of groups chose an equal output sharing. On the other hand, 
identity induces high ability participants to choose more equal sharing rules. Next we 
analyze the effect of group decisions on subsequent individual contributions. 
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Figure 3a shows the average contribution for each treatment
8
. It can be seen that 
contributions decrease over time (regression analysis in table 10 of appendix B, 
indicates a decreasing trend). It is clear that identity slightly increase effort decisions, 
however not significantly (Man-Whitney test, p=0.1736). Consequently, we do not 
find differences in individual profit (Utest, p=0.4497) or in the total team revenue 
(Utest, p=0.9988). Figure 3b shows contribution by type of participants, as we can 
observe, there are no significant differences in contribution levels of high ability 
members (Utest, p=0.6501), however, identity increases effort levels of low ability 
members (Utest, p= 0.0025). Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 5a but we can 
reject hypothesis 5b. Moreover we fail to reject hypothesis 6 that identity increase 
team efficiency.  
 
 
Figure 3a: Overall contribution by treatment 
                                                
8
 The data used to effort analysis is the ten rounds setting. Although we do not find statistical differences between the one-shot 
setting and the first round of the ten rounds setting in any of the analysis presented here, we consider more precise to present the 
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Figure 3b: Contribution by type and treatment.  
 
Observation 2: Team identity does not increase the effort levels of high ability 
members in teams with a heterogeneous composition, but increases contribution of 
low ability types.  
 
This is result contradicts previous experimental evidence with identical members 
and equal split, where induced identity increases cooperation (Eckel and Grossman, 
2005) as well as communication (Farrel, 1995; Crawford, 1998; Blume and Ortman, 
2007; Bornstein et al., 1989; Brosig et al., 2003) 
The effect of the different sharing rules decided by the group is each treatment is 
interesting to analyze, however, we do not have enough data to drive robust 
conclusions, as the high majority of groups decided to perform under an equal sharing 
rule. Therefore, we next analyze effort decisions under equal sharing rule.  
Nevertheless, we find some interesting results, which are reported in another version 
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1. Effort decisions under equal distribution rule.  
Table 3 shows the predicted and average effort by treatment, analyzing differences 
according to members’ individual voting decisions. The first two columns give the 
total average effort (predicted effort in brackets). The columns three to eight give the 
average effort according to participants voting decisions and column nine reports 
average effort when members do not have the option for voting (Marreiros 2010).  
We can observe that both types of participants exert an effort higher than predicted 
(Wilcoxon test p=0.0033 for both). More interesting, we find that with identity and an 
equal sharing rule the high ability members decrease their effort levels, although not 
significantly (Man-Whitney test p= 0.4057) while low ability members increase it 
significantly (Man-Whitney test p= 0.0126).  
 
Table 3: Average effort by type and vote decisions 
 
Average effort Equal Sharing 
 
 
  (vote=equal)  (vote=median)  
(vote=Second 





VOT ID VOT ID VOT ID VOT ID No vote 
High 
members  77(48) 71 86* 76 n/a 86 63** 41 78 
Low 
members  33**(17) 45 35* 46 15 18 n/a    n/a  39** 
 
These results have an interesting effect on individual payoffs. While the high 
ability members increase their individual payoff with identity (Man-Whitney test 
p=0.0284), the low abilities decrease it (Man-Whitney test p=0.0413). Figure 4a 
shows that in the VT and an equal sharing rule the low ability members receive a 
higher individual payoff than their high ability team mates (Wilcoxon text p= 0.0051), 
figure 5b shows that in the IDT the profit of high and low abilities are not significant 
different (Wilcoxon text p= 0.5751). Therefore, under an equal sharing rule, identity 
decreases dispersion on efforts and on individual payoffs (Mann Whitney test, 
p=0.0064; p=0.0197 respectively). 
In what efficiency is concerned, we do not find that identity increases team 
efficiency under an equal sharing rule (Mann Whitney test, p=0.5453). Therefore we 




Figure 4a: Average payoff under equal sharing in the voting treatment 
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Observation 3: Under an equal sharing rule, identity does not increase team 
efficiency but equalizes individual profits 
As identity leads to the majority of the groups deciding for an equal compensation 
scheme but not all members vote for it, we analyze individuals behavior when they 
vote for the sharing rule that ends up being the distributional rule decided by the 
group and when they did not. When the distribution rule decided by the group was the 
equal sharing and low ability members vote for it, identity increases their effort level 
when compared to the VT (Mann-Whitney test: p=0.0527). However, surprisingly, we 
can observe that identity has a negative effect on high ability members’ effort levels. 
When they vote for the equal sharing and this is the sharing rule decided by the group, 
identity decreases contributions when compared to the VT (Mann-Whitney test, p= 
0.0821).  
 
3. Regression analysis.  
i) Effort 
 
Table 7: Panel data regression on effort decisions – GLS  
Effort  Overall (1) Equal share (2) 
Equal share   
High skilled (3) 
Equal share 
 Low skilled (4) 
Vote Sec_best 1.92 (5.62) -13.96** (5.66) -14.93** (6.72) 
  Vote Median  18.01** (7.28) -43.07*** (9.65) -24.10* (12.62) -29.99** (14.38) 
Treatment  23.65*** (3.94) 13.43*** (3.42) 2.26 (5.21) 27.76*** (4.74) 
Type  51.12*** (7.33) 36.52*** (7.18) 
    Majority_1 15.62*** (4 .77) 18.16*** (4.61) 10.28 (7.76) 14.10** (5.88) 
SR_Equal -42.03*** (6.92) 
      SR_Median  15.99 (11.19) 
      Age  0.73* (0.44) 1.87*** (0.38) 3.32*** (0.48) -0.86 (0.82) 
Gender  16.03*** (3.86) 19.22*** (3.65) 28.59*** (4.86) 11.88** (4.73) 
Num siblings -5.67*** (1.79) -0.01 (1.61) -1.41 (1.79) -0.74 (3.28) 
Career  9.23** (3.80) 19.11*** (3.93) 9.49* (5.51) 8.31 (5.24) 
Career year 1.87 (1.33) 1.64 (1.33) -1.89 (2.04) 2.80 (1.75) 
session 0.88 (3.57) 7.26** (3.49) 19.32*** (5.07) 0.83 (5.73) 
Period -5.46***  (0.82) -4.93*** (0.76) -5.96*** (1.10) -2.36 (2.28) 



































 Prob > chi2      0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at p=0.01, p=0.05 and p=0.10, 
respectively.  
 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of effort decisions using regression 
analysis. In table 7 we report the estimation results of a panel data general least 
squares with random effects at the subject level. We regress the individual effort on 
voting decisions, using dummy variables (vote equal; vote median and vote 
proportional); a dummy to represent IDT (treatment); a dummy for high skilled 
players (type); a dummy to represent if the decisions were made by the majority of 
members of if there was a tie (Majority); dummies for the sharing rule decided by the 
group (SR_equal; SR_median; SR_proportional). We control for age; gender; number 
of siblings; career (if studying economics or not) and career year. We also control for 
session and include period and group dummies in all models. In model 1 we include 
all the data, in model 2 we analyze effort decision under the equal sharing rule, in 
model 3 we focus on the high skilled level of effort under an equal sharing and in 
model 4 we center our focus on low skilled level of effort under an equal sharing.  
The general model (1) indicates that the effort performed by those that vote for the 
second best sharing rule does not differ from the effort of those that vote for the equal 
share. In contrast, those who vote for the median share perform a significantly higher 
effort than those who vote for the equal share. We observe that identity has a positive 
effect on effort decisions, as observed by the significant coefficient of “Treatment” 
variable. This result clearly confirms our conjecture 5 that identity increase effort 
levels.   
Confirming the non-parametric results, we observe that high skilled types exert a 
higher effort than their low skilled teammates. How the distributional rule was 
decided has also an impact on effort level, we observe that when it was decided by 
majority (three, four or five members) subjects performed a higher effort than when 
there was a tie and the sharing rule was decided randomly. In relation to the 
demographic characteristics, we find that females and economics students tend to 
exert higher effort, in contrast, higher the number of siblings, lower the effort. 
Most importantly, and corroborating our non-parametric results, we find that 
when there is an equal division of total profit the effort level is significantly lower 
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than when the distributional rule is the second best (SR_Equal). No significant 
differences between the median share and the second best (SR_Median).  
Considering this result we regress effort level when the distributional rule was the 
equal share (model 2). We find that, although effort is higher in the IDT, those who 
do not vote for the equal share (vote in the second best or in the median share) 
performed a lower effort than those who actually vote for the sharing rule decided by 
the majority of the group. This result is still highly significant when analyzing by type 
of subject (model 3 and 4), however, we can see that identity does not have an impact 
on high skilled subjects and does have it in low skilled’ subjects. We find that, in 
contrast to low skilled, effort of high skilled types was not affected by the fact that the 
sharing rule was decided by the majority or due to a tie. 
We also find a session effect in high skilled level of effort when the equal share 
was the distributional rule decided by the group. This is due to group effects, as when 
the group dummies were taken out of the model this effect disappears. Period has an 
effect in all models, confirming a well known effect on group experiments, where 
higher the period lower the effort level.   
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
Accordingly to standard economic theory heterogeneous teams should operate 
under a distributional rule that takes into account the differences in agents’ inputs or 
skills. However, under non-hierarchical forms of organization, when members have to 
decide how to divide the total team output, social concerns may emerge as individuals 
could be conflicted between what is the best for them and what the group or even the 
society expects them to do.  
In this paper we explore how these social concerns affect teams mostly composed 
by high ability participants in terms of distribution preferences and consequently on 
team efficiency. We ask if heterogeneous self-manage teams tend to choose equal 
sharing rules instead of a sharing rule that maximizes team welfare. And if so, we ask 
why: Are there social preferences that induce members to prefer equal distributions? 
Or is there some group identity formation that induces to these preferences for 
equality? 
To answer these questions we provide a theoretical explanation based on social 
identity and test is experimentally.  We compare two treatments based on a team 
production model. The control treatment, which we call the voting treatment, is 
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designed to understand the distributional preferences of members without social 
interaction. The second treatment, which we call the identity treatment, is designed to 
understand the effects of induced identity in distributional choices and effort levels. 
Our results indicate that in absence of social interaction participants tend to vote 
for the distributional rule that leads them to better monetary payoffs. While the 
majority of the high ability members vote for the second best compensation scheme, 
which gives them a higher share of the total team output, the low ability members 
vote for an equal split. Nevertheless, we find some heterogeneity in preferences, as 30 
percent of high ability participants show preferences for equality. We argue that in 
this treatment, participants act in accordance with their perceptions of fairness, which 
are conditioned by their personal identities.  
With induced identity the percentage of high ability members that vote on the 
equal share increases from 30 percent to 70 percent. This result indicates that social 
identity has a strong impact on distributional preferences. We argue that with social 
interactions and communication, reveled preferences can change as the prescribed or 
ideal behavior for the team (social category) could be affected by team decisions. As 
the high majority of groups where identity was manufactured decide to operate under 
an equal distributional rule, identity can be an explanation for the use of equal splits 
in heterogeneous self-managed teams.   
 Surprisingly, we do not find that identity increases team efficiency when 
heterogeneous teams operate under an equal distribution of total output, as is the case 
with homogenous agents (Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Identity has a positive effect 
on low ability participants, increasing their effort level, however does not have an 
impact on high abilities performance. Moreover, we find that the high ability 
members who do not vote on the sharing rule decided by the majority of the group 
highly decrease their effort level. We conjecture that they behave against the group 
goal as they feel as outsiders of the group. This result is consistent with Akerlof and 
Kranton (2005) theory that suggests that when members feel as outsiders they gain 
utility when acting against the group norms. Nonetheless, we find that identity 
equalizes individual payoffs. Therefore, we conjecture that difference aversion could 
be a consequence of group identity.   
Our results confirm the three general consequences of identity in organizations 
suggested by SIT (Ashforth el al., 1989). First, identity induces individuals to perform 
actions consistent with relevant aspects of their identities. Second, it affects the 
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outcomes associated with intragroup cooperation and fairness to the team and third, 
may also prompt internalization and adherence to group values and norms and 
engender homogeneity in attitudes and behavior (equality and profits equalization).  
We also find that when groups operate under a proportional compensation scheme 
that weighs equal sharing and wealth maximization criteria, (the median sharing rule 
in our experiment) participants tend to increase their effort level and team efficiency 
highly increases. This is consistent with Amartya Sen (1966) theory that an optimal 
allocation of resources should give part to needs and part to abilities. However just a 
few groups vote for it. More data on the effect on this type of sharing rules could be 
interesting.  
A natural extension of this work is to test if the pictures stage alone or the 
communication stage alone also influences behavior, and if so to what extent. We 
conjecture that the results will be less evidence as we consider that without 
communication and socialization the effect of identity is lower. To increase the effect 
of identity, allow communication in all rounds of effort will be the nest step. We 
conjecture that it will increases high ability levels of effort as in other studies on 
communication and identity (Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Other extension could be 
allowing for renegotiation of the sharing rule after the 10 rounds period to understand 
if the high abilities’ participants maintain their votes for equal share under identity as 
in Balafoutas et al. (2013).  
Performing this experiment with natural identities would give robustness to these 
results, as well as majority low ability teams. More data on a sharing rule that gives 
part to needs and part to skills would also be interesting.  
In resume, the results of this paper are a contribution to better understand the black 
box of self managed teams, and it is again a reinforcement that social variables, as 
identity, influence team member’s behavior in a way that their actions have more in 
consideration group effects than self maximization.  
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A. Instructions for the identity treatment 
You have been asked to participate in a study that analysis group decision making. 
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental Monetary Units 
(EMUs) instead of Euros. Each participant will receive an initial endowment in EMU. 
You may earn an additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the 
experiment and others decisions. Your payoffs will be calculated in terms of EMUs 
and then converted to euros at the end of the experiment at a rate of 800 EMUs = 1 
Euro. This money will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. You will 
be given a set of instructions that will be read aloud to all participants. If you have 
any question, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will go to you and 
your question will be solved. 
The decision situation: 
At the beginning of the experiment you and four other participants will be 
randomly assigned to your group. There will be 25 participants in the room that will 
be randomly assigned to the Blue, Red, Yellow, Green or White group. The identity 
of the other participants will not be revealed and you cannot interact with the other 
members of the group unless you are asked to do it.  
 In your group there are three participants that will be called of type 1, and two 
participants of type 2. You will be random selected to be a type 1 or a type 2.  
This experiment has two parts. The first part has one stage and the second part has 
two stages. In the first part you have to answer some questions about paintings. The 
second part is a decision game where you have to choose a number and how to 
allocate the earning your group made between yourself.   
Instructions for the first part:   
In the first screen of the experiment you should introduce your ID number. In the 
next screen you will know to which group you were assigned (Blue, Red, Green, 
Yellow or White). Next you will have 2 minutes to study 8 images, the first 4 are 
painting from Picasso and the last 4 are paintings from Dali. Next you will see 2 
pictures more, and you have to answer who painted these pictures. On the right you 
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find a chat box where you can chat with the members of your group to help or be 
helped in given the correct answers. Please do not identify yourself and do not use 
inappropriate language. For each correct answer you will earn 200 UME. 
Instructions for the second part: 
As referred earlier, there will be two types of players in your group, the type 1 and 
the type 2. You will know your type in the second stage, but will not know who are 
the others who that share your type or who are of the other type.  
In the second stage you and your team members will have to choose how to 
allocate the amount of money made by the group. You have three options, and have to 
choose only one. The option decided by the majority of the group will determine the 
distribution of your and others payoffs. 
In the third stage, you and the other three subjects of the group must choose a 
number between 0 and 240 without knowing the decisions of the other members of 
the group. 
The election of this number has some implications. The number you choose will 
have a different value depending on your type: if you are type 1 the value of the 
number is the chosen number multiplied by 24 and if you are type 2 is the chosen 
number multiplied by 17 (see table k*number). The values of the chosen numbers off 
the five members of the group are add and each one of the members receives a 
percentage of that sum, we will call this sum RESULT. This percentage corresponds 
to the option decided by the majority of the group in the second stage.  
On the other hand your chosen number causes a certain cost. As mentioned there 
are two types of participants in your group. Each type of participant has different cost 
associated to each possible number that you chose. This means that the type 1 
participants have a cost for the chosen number that is equal among them but different 
of the cost that type 2 participants have for this number. The cost of the number that 
you chose will be deducted directly of your payoff. 
In the moment that the experiment starts you will know which type of participant 
you are in the group and you can consult the cost table in the annex. In this table you 




You can also see that each number has a different cost. For the type 1 members the 
cost of the number is equal to the square of the chosen number divided by 20, while 
for the type 2 members it is equal to the square of the chosen number divided by 10.  
In the next table you can see an example of how to reed the table.  
Example Cost Table  












24 2 48 0,2  17 2 34 0,4 
24 5 120 1,3  17 5 85 2,5 
24 15 360 11,3  17 15 255 22,5 
24 20 480 20,0  17 20 340 40,0 
24 50 1200 125,0  17 50 850 250,0 
24 149 3576 1110,1  17 149 2533 2220,0 
 
You can read your cost table by looking down the second column where you can 
find the decision numbers; the third column informs you of the value of this number 
and in the forth column you can check the cost of this number. For example, if you 
are type 1 and choose the number 15, the value of this number is 360 and has a cost of 
11.3, while if you are type 2 and choose the number 15, the value of this number is 
255 and has a cost of 22.5. Note that the higher the number you choose the higher its 
cost.  
Instructions for the first stage of the second part 
After finishing the first part, the second part of the experiment will began. You will 
remain in the same group of the first part.  
In the first stage of this part you will have to choose the distributional rule of the 
Result (sum of the value of the decision numbers choose by the five elements of the 
group). You have to choose between 3 options, knowing that the option decided by 
the majority of the group will determine your and others payoffs. 
Option A:         Type 1: 30% 
Type 2:   5% 
Option B: Type 1: 20% 
Type 2: 20% 
Option C:  Type 1: 25% 




If the majority of members choose the option A, this means that each one of the 
type 1 members will receive 30 percent of the result, while each of the type 2 
members will receive 5 percent of the result. If the majority of members choose the 
option B, all members receive 20 percent of the result, independent of the type. If the 
majority of members choose the option C, this means that each one of the type 1 
members will receive 25 percent of the result, while each of the type 2 members will 
receive 12,5 percent of the result. From this percentage of the result it will de 
deducted the cost of the number.  
You can use the chat box to communicate with the others members of the group. 
Note that you can only chat in this stage.  In the next stage, where you have to decide 
the number, you will not be allowed to interact with your team mates.  
You can also use a help screen to do simulations about your and others earning. 
How to use the help screen: 
You can use the help screen to make simulations en relation to the number you can 
choose and the number that the other could choose. As you don’t know which number 
the other will choose, you can simulate typing a number between 0 and 240 in the 
correspondent field. If you press “calculate” you can see the value and cost of each of 
these numbers accordingly to the correspondent member. You can also see the final 
result of your simulation for each of the 3 options when press “ see calculations”. At 
the bottom of the screen you can see the sum of the value of the numbers that you 
simulate as long as the proportions that you and the other elements of the group could 
receive. If you press “Decision screen” you turn to the decision screen. Your decision 
will be validate when you press the “continue” button.  
Instructions for the second stage of the second part 
After the distribution rule have been decided by the majority of the group, you will 
see a screen where you will know which of the options will determine yours and 
others payoffs. You have to insert a number between 0 and 240 in the correspondent 
field, if you press OK you can see the value and cost of the number as well as the 
proportion of the result that you will receive. You can use the help screen in this 
stage, but you cannot communicate with your group.  
Calculations of your payoffs:  
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Your payoff in UME depends of the distribution rule determined in the first stage 
of the second part:  
Option A: 
Payoff Type 1 = 0,30*Result-cost individual cost type 1 
Payoff Type 2 = 0,05* Result-cost individual cost type 2 
 
Option B: 
Payoff Type 1 = 0,20*Result-cost individual cost type 1 
Payoff Type 2 = 0,05* Result-cost individual cost type 2 
 
Option C: 
Payoff Type 1 = 0,25*Result-cost individual cost type 1 
Payoff Type 2 = 0,125* Result-cost individual cost type 2 
 
In the case you suffer losses you will receive a minimum capital that range from 5 
to 2 euros, depending on how much you loss. 
 
Example of how your earning will be determined: 
If, for example, each one of the members of the group choose the number 15. For 
the type 1 members, the number has a value of 360 and a cost of 11,3. For the type 2 
members the number has a cost of 255 and a value of 22,5. the result will be: 
360*3+255*2=1590 EMUs.  
If the option decided by the majority of the group was option A and you are a type 
1, your payoff will be: 0.30*1590–11,3=465,7 UME. If your are a type 2 members, 
your payoff will be: 0.05*1590–22,5=57 UME. 
If the option decided by the majority of the group was option B and you are a type 
1, your payoff will be: 0.20*1590–11,3=306,7 UME.. If your are a type 2 members, 
your payoff will be: 0.20*1590–22,5=295,5 UME. 
If the option decided by the majority of the group was option C and you are a type 
1, your payoff will be: 0.25*1590–11,3=386,2 UME. If your are a type 2 members, 




1. Suppose that you are a type 2 member and choose a number of 5, the value of 
your number is _______ and the cost of your chosen number is _______. Suppose 
that the other type 2 member have chosen the number 50 and each one of the type 1 
members have chosen the number 20, the total result is _________, Suppose that the 
distributional rule decided was option A, then your payoff is ____________.  
2. Suppose that you are a type 1 member and choose a number of 2, the value of 
your number is _________ and the cost of your chosen number is _______. Suppose 
that the other type 1 members have chosen the number 149, and the type 2 members 
have chosen the number of 5, the total result is _________. Suppose that the 
distribution rule decided by the group was the option B, then your payoff 
is____________.  
Thank you for your participation. After finishing the experiment please wait 
at the computer in order to know your payoffs in euros and receive new 
instructions for the next experiment. 
 
B. Experimental Implementation and Design Discussion 
 
i) Implementation and Information conditions  
As being a non-real effort experiment expressions like effort and cost of effort are 
substituted by expressions like number and cost of number and high and low skilled 
types are substituted by type 1 and type 2 subjects. In both treatments the instructions 
are read aloud
9
. Subjects are told that they will play the game for one round and that 
they will be randomly matched with four other subjects from the room, the group 
being composed by three type 1 (high skilled) subjects and two type 2 (low skilled) 
subjects and that they will be randomly selected to be type 1 or type 2 subjects but do 
no information about the identity of the other members of the group will be given. In 
the VT they are told that no interaction is allowed. They are told that they have to 
                                                
9
 Instructions in English for the identity treatment are in appendix A. Instructions in Spanish and cost 
tables are available upon request.  
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choose a number between 0 to 250
10
, which has a cost and a value.  Along with the 
instructions they are given cost tables where they can find the value and the cost 
correspondent to each of the possible numbers. Their payoffs are explained as being a 
proportion of the sum of the values of the numbers chosen by the five members of the 
group less the individual cost of the number. They are told that this proportion is 
decided on a first stage, majority rules, from a set of three options (A, B and C) and 
that if there is a tie the distribution rule will be determined randomly. After subjects 
fulfill some comprehension questions the team game starts. At the end of each round, 
subjects are informed about the sum of the value of the numbers of the group (team 
revenue) and their individual profit. No information is given about the numbers 
chosen (effort) by the others members of the group.  
After the individual profit is displayed on the screen, they are told that the first part 
of the experiment is over and that their earnings in this part will be added to the gains 
in the second part. After receiving additional instructions for the second part subjects 
are randomly selected to be type 1 or type 2 and randomly matched to a different 
group that stays fixed for the 10 rounds (partner matching). They are told that they 
will play the same game but the decision number stage is repeated for 10 rounds 
under the distributional rule decided in the first round.   
In the IDT, after subjects are randomly matched to a group color: Blue, Red, 
Yellow, Green and Fuchsia, participants observe a screen with eight painting pictures, 
four identified as being from Picasso and four from Dali. In a following screen, they 
observe two other pictures from the same artists but not identified, and they have to 
answer which artist painted those pictures. Although the answers are individual, 
subjects can communicate, through chat with the members of their group to give the 
correct answers. They earn a small amount of money for each of the correct answers. 
To the chat, members are identified by the group color and a number (for example 
Blue 3), however, they cannot further identify themselves or use inappropriate 
language. In a second part, they have to choose the sharing rule and can also 
communicate to decide the best option to vote. As in the VT, they just know what the 
majority voted, not individual choices and they cannot discuss the voting results, i.e. 
no communication is permitted after the result of voting. The third part is equal to the 
                                                
10
 They can use a help screen to make simulation of results for each of the sharing rules in the first 
stage and for the voted sharing rule in the second stage.  
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VT and no communication is allowed. Subjects play the one shot setting first and the 
10 rounds setting afterwards, where they are randomly matched to another group 
color, which stays fix for the 10 rounds; play the pictures stage with different pictures 
from the same artists; communicate to vote only in the first round and make effort 
decisions for the 10 rounds under the same distributional rule decided in the voting 
stage. 
ii) Design discussion  
A couple of discussions relative to the experimental design are in order. The first is 
related to the process of enhancing group identity in the IDT. Manufacturing group 
identity in the laboratory is not a straightforward task. For this reason, we combine 
several actions, from week to strong identity, that have proved to produce group 
effects in previous experiments. Eckel and Grossman (2005) used several treatments 
to manufacture identity, between them assignation of subjects to a group color and 
participation on a group task before a team game experiment with face-to-face 
interaction. Although previous experimental evidence indicates that a simple 
assignment of subjects to a certain group by color or painting preferences produce the 
same group effects than random assignment, combining this treatment with a pre-
game task with communication has produced strong group effects (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2005; Chen and Li, 2009). Therefore, in our experiment firstly, subjects 
are randomly matched to five different group colors and secondly, we use the same 
pre-game painting task with chat as in Chen and Li (2009). Although face-to-face 
treatments could create a higher sense of identity than communication through chat, it 
could also lead to many confounding and uncontrolled effects (Roth, 1995), therefore, 
we opt for communication through chat. Thirdly, we allow for communication in the 
voting stage for ten minutes. Social psychology experiments have shown that the most 
effective way for manipulate identity in experiments is by allowing discussion of the 
group dilemma (Orbell et al., 1988; Dawes et al., 1986; 1990; Brickman, 1987; Kerr 
and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Although minimal group experiments, where subjects 
have to make decision concerning members of their own group (ingroup) and/or 
members from other group (outgroup), have shown that even a merely random 
matching induces to ingroup favoritism (Tajtel and Turne, 1979, Orbell et al., 1988) 
find that without discussion of the dilemma these effects are minimal. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the content of the messages can help us understand the effects of 
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identity and communication in individual and group behavior. To further evaluate the 
effects of identity we adapt the Chen and Li (2009) final questionnaire to our setting. 
This will allow us to understand fairness consideration and to what extend group 
attachment and discussion of the group dilemma influenced participants’ decisions.  
 
 
C. Communication Analysis 
We have seen that identity has a strong effect on the distributional preferences of 
high skilled participants but not an effect on their effort decisions; in contrast, it has a 
positive effect on the performance of low skilled but no effect on their sharing 
preferences. In this subsection we analyze the contents of the communication to better 
understand what drives the voting results. Recall that in the IDT, in addition to the 
pictures stage, where subjects could freely chat to perform a simple task before the 
dilemma starts, subjects could discuss the distributional rule options through the chat 
in the voting stage.   
 






Code “1”  




Type1 Type2  Total  
C1 Proposal equal shares (Option A)  15% 43% 65% 52% 
  Agreement 16% 28% 20% 25% 
C2 Proposal second best share (Option C) 2% 10% 3% 7% 
  Agreement 1% 1% 0% 0% 
C3 Proposal of median share (Option B) 2% 7% 3% 5% 
  Agreement 1% 3% 28% 3% 
C4 Appeal to fairness 6% 13% 18% 20% 
C5 Appeal to equity 3% 13% 18% 15% 
C6 Appeal to not hurt low skilled members 3% 8% 20% 13% 
C7 Appeal to the benefit of all members 5% 10% 23% 15% 
C8 Refer to majority of high skilled  3% 17% 0% 10% 
C9 Refer to selfish preferences  4% 13% 10% 11% 
C10 Proposal to pact on numbers 12% 28% 25% 27% 
  Agreement 2% 0% 3% 1% 
C11 Proposal of numbers  13% 18% 20% 19% 
                                                
11
 The relative frequency of the categories is calculated dividing the number of times that the category 
was coded “1” from the total of messages coded as “1", which were 431 in total. 
12
 In subjects analysis, we coded as “1” if the subject participated in the category and “0” if he didn’t. 




  Agreement 8% 3% 5% 4% 
C12 Appeal to commitment 1% 5% 3% 4% 
  Group level (% of groups)  
        Group agree on Sharing Rule 
   
75% 
     Group pact Numbers  
   
25% 
     Group engage in friendly talk  
   
10% 
In the pictures stage, the high majority of the individuals participate in 
conversations about the paintings. To the communication analysis of the voting stage, 
we developed and implemented a coding scheme for the messages content parallel to 
those implemented by Brandts and Cooper (2007) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009). 
To analyze the messages we developed 12 categories for the different types of 
statements and agreements as follows: First we establish a preliminary set of 
categories based on the conjectures presented and prior research. After reading a 
sample of the chat we added other categories that appeared to be relevant. 
Subsequently, one research assistant independently coded the chat, assigning the 
value of “one” if the message contained statements or arguments relative to a category 
and “zero” otherwise. The only information given to the coder was the instructions for 
the experiment, therefore he just had the information that participants on the 
experiment had. Finally the categories were then reconciled. In addition, we analyze if 
the group actually agreed on the sharing rule; if the group made a pact on which 
numbers they should choose in the following stage and if the group engaged in 
friendly talk outside the dilemma
13
.  
Table 4 lists the categories for coding, their description, the relative frequency that 
a category was coded as present (value=1) and the percentage of subjects that 
participate in conversations of the category (discriminated by type). The proposal to 
choose equal shares (C1); proposals to make agreements on the numbers to choose in 
the next stage (C10) and proposals on which numbers to choose (C11) were, by far, 
the most frequent categories. In the category of proposing equal shares (C1), about 15 
percent of cases were proposals and 16 percent were agreements. This category was 
discussed in all the groups, where 77 percent of the subjects participated on it. About 
65 percent of the low skilled players and 43 percent of high skilled participants 
propose the use of this distributional rule by the group. Nonetheless, we find that just 
in 55 percent of the cases the first member that proposes equal shares was a low 
skilled participant, being a high skilled subject that first makes this proposal in the 
                                                
13
 The coder was also asked to check for these group decisions.   
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remaining 45 percent of the cases. The proposals of equal sharing were backed up by 
arguments appealing to fairness (C4), equity (C5), not hurt the low skilled’ subjects 
(C6) and arguments that the equal sharing is the one that benefit all (C7). Proposals of 
second best (present in 15 percent of the groups) and median share (present in 25 
percent of the groups) made by high skilled, were contradict by low skilled with 
arguments appealing to fairness (C4), not to be selfish (C9) and not to hurt low skilled 
subjects (C7). In 75 percent of the groups an agreement on the distributional rule was 
reached, which justifies the increase of consensus. About 80 percent of the high 
skilled subjects that engage in conversations about choosing equal shares (C1), either 
by proposing or agreeing with it, actually vote on the equal share.  
We can see that 27 percent of the subjects propose to make a pact on numbers 
(C10), however, just 23 percent of subjects participate in conversations about 
reaching an agreement on the numbers to choose in the following stage (C11). 
Although 50 percent of the groups engage in these type of conversations (C11), just 
25 percent of groups reach an agreement. About 60 percent of these groups comply 
with it. However, in 50 percent of those group subjects decrease their effort levels 
after the second period as not all members maintain the pacted level of effort.  
 
D. Robustness checks: 
i) Voting decisions 
Table 6: Logit regression: determinants on voting equal 




 treatment (3) 
Treatment 1.835*** (0.498) 
    Type -3.061*** (0.522) -3.006*** (0.607) -8.040*** (2.328) 
Age 0.015 (0.051) -0.025 (0.058) 0.800*** (0.260) 
Gender 1.385*** (0.464) 1.907*** (0.601) 2.750*** (0.682) 
Career -1.107** (0.452) -0.590 (0.718) -5.317*** (1.644) 
Career year 0.079 (0.136) 0.246 (0.229) 0.038 (0.413) 
Session 0.106 (0.592) -0.699 (0.761) -0.308 (1.111) 
Period -0.058 (0.438) -0.096 (0.461) 3.447* (1.486) 
Gender*Type 0.657 (0.552) 
    Num MSG Picture 
    
0.136*** (0.050) 
C1 
    
5.321*** (1.600) 
C2 
    
5.848* (3.026) 
C3 
    
-1.891 (1.641) 
C4 
    
-1.477 (1.094) 
C5 
    
-1.034 (1.166) 
C6+C7 





    
2.736 (1.454) 
C10+C11 
    
2.935 (1.838) 
C12 
    
4.879** (2.076) 
Group agree SR 
    
7.180*** (1.787) 
Group agree Num 
    
-8.841*** (2.863) 
Cons -5.060*** (1.354) -4.460*** (1.641) -21.673*** (6.568) 
Number of Obs 196   100   96   





 Pseudo R2 0.289   0.3227   0.6181   
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at p=0.01, p=0.05 and p=0.10, 
respectively. Dependent variable: Vote Equal=1 if subjects voted equal and Vote Equal=0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: Treatment=0 for the VTand Treatment=1for the IDT; Type=1 for the high 
skilled subjects and Type=0 for the low skilled; Gender=1 for females and Gender=0 for males; 
Career=1 if subjects study economics or business, Career=0 otherwise; Session=0 for the first sessions 
performed and Session=1 for the second sessions; Period=0 for the one shot setting and Period=1 for 
the first round of the ten rounds setting.  
 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of voting on equal shares using 
regression analysis. The results essentially corroborate those obtained with the non-
parametric tests reported previously and allow us to control for subjects’ demographic 
characteristic and to understand the effect of the communication categories.  
Table 6 presents the logit regression
14
. In the first model (all treatments) we can 
observe that in the IDT the odds of voting on the equal share increase as indicated by 
the significant coefficient for the “Treatment” dummy. This is consistent with our 
non-parametric results and adds support to our third conjecture that identity changes 
the distributional preferences of members.  
Low skilled types are more prone to vote on equal shares than high skilled types in 
both treatments as we can seen by the significant and negative coefficient for the 
“Type” dummy in model (1), (2) and (3). We can also see that there is a significant 
effect of gender on equality preferences. We can observe that being female increase 
the odds of voting equal, as observed by the significant and positive coefficient on 
“Gender” dummy in all the models. There is no effect on the interaction gender and 
type (Gender*Type) in model (1)), meaning that females vote more for equal shares 
independently of being high or low skilled type. We can also see that studding 
economics or business have a negative effect on choosing equal shares (Career). This 
is not an unusual result in experiments, as these students could be more aware of the 
existence of equilibrium outcomes. The significance of this variable disappears in the 
VT(model 2). Analyzing the IDT (model 3) we can see that the effect of type, gender 
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 In this analysis we use the data of the one-shot setting and the first round of the ten rounds setting. 
We perform the same regressions using panel data and the results are similar.  
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and career is the same as in the VT , but age has now an effect. Older students tend to 
choose more equal shares. We can also observe that the higher the number of 
messages sent by subjects on the pictures stage higher the tendency to choose equal 
shares (Num MSG Picture). Also, participation on conversations about voting on 
equal shares (category C1) increases the probability of voting equal. The same effect 
happens on the category C2, which refers to proposals of voting on second best 
shares. We conjecture that this contradictory effect is observed because some of the 
few subjects that propose this sharing rule were convinced by the others to vote equal. 
Except for the appeal to commitment category dummy (C12), which increases the 
odds of voting equally, none of the other categories that were used to backup 
arguments on voting options have a significant effect
15
. The fact that the group 
reaches an agreement on the distributional rule also increases the probability of voting 
on equal shares. However, agreeing on the numbers for the next stage has a negative 
effect of voting equal. This could be justified by the fact that some groups that agree 
on the numbers decide to vote on the median sharing rule.  
 
E. Post-experimental questionnaire analysis 
Table 5: Post-experimental questionnaire 
Questions [coding in square brackets] Mean values 










Set 1 (all treatments)       
Q1. Have you considered fair the decision 
made by the majority of the group in the 
second stage? [1="Fair"; 0="Unfair"] 
0.73 0.50 0.64 0.80 0.70 0.76 
Q2. In the second stage, when you had to 
choose the distributional rule, the fact of 
being in your group had any influence? 
[0="No"; 1="yes, I chose Option A"; 
2="yes, I chose Option B"; 3="yes, I 
chose Option C"] 
1.6 1.2 1.44 1.1 0.85 1 
Q3. In the third stage, when you had to 
choose the number, the fact of being in 
your group influenced your decision? 
[0="No"; 1="yes, I chose a high number"; 
2="yes, I chose a low number"] 
0.87 1.1 0.96 0.9 0.75 0.84 
Q4. In a scale from 1 to 10, please indicate 
the level of identification with your group 
during the experiment.  
5.2 3.2 4.4 5.7 5.3 5.54 
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Set 2 (Identity treatment)       
Q5. In the second stage, when you had to 
choose the distributional rule, the fact of 
being able to communicate with the other 
members of the group had any influence 
in your decision? [0="No"; 1="yes, I 
chose a more egalitarian distribution"; 
2="yes, I chose a less egalitarian 
distribution"] 
   0.73 0.55 0.66 
 
After the experiment subjects answered individually several questions regarding 
their decisions during the experiment. Table 5 lists all the questions and their mean 
answers. The answers to question 1 (Q1) reveal that both high and low skilled 
members in both the VT and in the IDT considered fair the distribution rule decided 
by the majority of the group.  
Analyzing by sharing rule, we find that when the sharing rule decided by the 
group was the equal split, around 75 percent of members found it fair, no significant 
differences between types or treatment. When the sharing rule decided was the second 
best share, about 60 percent of high skilled members found it fair and 67 percent of 
low skilled members found it unfair. This data is relative to the VT as in the IDT none 
of the groups voted for this distributional rule. When the sharing rule decided was the 
median share, in the VT about 67 percent of the high skilled and 50 percent of the low 
skilled found it unfair. As this sharing rule was determined randomly due to a tie in 
some groups, participants’ answers could have been affected for this fact. In the IDT, 
100 percent of the high skilled and 50 percent of the low skilled found fair that the 
majority of the group decided to use the median sharing rule. This sharing rule was 
chosen after the majority of the members of the group have agreed on the numbers to 
choose in the next stage. It seems that most of subjects considered the group decisions 
quite fair in both treatments. This could indicate that the choice of equal sharing by 
majority high skilled teams is due to a concern for the well being of the least well off 
and preferences for equality.  
Concerning Q2, we find that the fact of being in their group influenced both high 
and low skilled in choosing equal sharing rule in both treatments. We find no 
differences between treatments (Mann-Whitney test: Overall: p= 0.1043; high skilled: 
p= 0.1832, low skilled: p= 0.3040). In this question we are measuring the effect of 
being in a group, without focus on induced identity.  Accordingly to Tajfel and Turner 
(1979), just the fact of being in the same group can create group attachment and affect 
subjects decisions, even without interaction. This minimal group effect seems to be 
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present here. We find the same effect on Q3, as being in their group influenced both 
high and low skilled in choosing a higher number. We find no differences between 
treatments (Mann-Whitney test: Overall: p= 0.5690; high skilled: p= 0.9283, low 
skilled: p= 0.3447).  
Question 4 follows Chen and Li (2009), question on group attachment where 
subjects were asked to rank form 1 to 10 the level of identification with the group 
during the experiment. We find that overall the level of identification with the group 
increased in the IDT (U-test, p=0.0855). Surprisingly, the high skilled subjects have 
an average level of identification higher than 5 in both treatments and manufacturing 
identity does not have a significant effect on them (U-test, p=0.5040). In contrast, this 
effect is significant for the low skilled subjects (U-test, p=0.0411). This shed some 
light in our previous results, as some of high skilled subjects chose equal sharing even 
in the VT. Again, a minimal group effect seems to create a certain level of identity. 
For the low skilled members, this increase in the level of identity its consistent with 
their increase in effort supplied in the IDT.  
Finally, regarding Q5, we find that communication influenced subjects voting 
decisions, especially of high skilled, but not as much as the simple fact of being in 
their group (Q2) (Wilcoxon sign-rank test: Overall: p= 0.0017; high skilled: p= 
0.0266, low skilled: p= 0.0143). Therefore, we conjecture that the choice of equal 
sharing by the high skilled members both in the VT and in the IDT was due to a sense 
of group belonging. Induced identity with communication increased this sense of 
belonging and increased responsibility to behave as prescribed.  
